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JOINT TENANCY:
ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PROBLEMS
INTRODUCTION
The purposes of this article are to examine some of the more
significant estate and gift tax consequences of joint tenancies in
Wisconsin real estate and in personal property owned by Wisconsin
residents and to consider the effect of recent judicial decisions on
the effectiveness of termination of joint tenancies as an estate plan-
ning device. The application of the tax principles to Wisconsin real
estate and personal property owned by Wisconsin residents will
also be considered.
Under Section 2040 of the Internal Revenue Code, the entire
value of property held jointly by the decedent and another person
or persons, with the right of survivorship at the time of decedent's
death, is included in the decedent's gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes, except to the extent that it can be shown that the
value is attributable to consideration furnished by the surviving
joint tenant or tenants or unless the jointly held property was ac-
quired by the decedent and the other joint tenant(s) as a gift, de-
vise, bequest, or inheritance.' Therefore, if the executor is unable to
rebut the presumption that the decedent furnished the entire con-
sideration, the entire value of the property will be subject to federal
estate tax on the death of the decedent and again be subject to fed-
eral estate tax on the death of the surviving joint tenant. Although
some relief is afforded under section 2013 as a credit against federal
estate tax if the surviving joint tenant dies within ten years of the
decedent, the prospect of "double taxation" of the entire value of
the property may make the joint tenancy an unnecessarily expens-
ive method of property ownership for persons whose estates are
subject to federal estate taxation. 2 Of course, if the joint tenants
are husband and wife, the property qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion.3 For Wisconsin inheritance tax purposes, one-half the value of
the property is generally taxed on the death of either joint tenant.4
' Treas. Reg. §20.2040-1 (a) (1958).
2 For a consideration of the advantages and other disadvantages of ownership
in joint tenancy, see EcKHARDT, WORKBOOK FOR WISCONSIN ESTATE PLANNERS,
C. 7 (1961).
3 INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §2056 (e) (5).
4 WIs. STAT. §72.01(6) (1963). Even though the surviving joint tenant supplied
all of the considerations for the property, he will be liable for an inheritance
tax on one-half the value of the property. Estate of Hounsell, 252 Wis. 138,
31 N.W. 2d 203 (1948); Estate of Atkinson, 261 Wis. 481, 53 N.W. 2d 185(1952). Similarly, even though the surviving joint tenant supplied none of
the consideration for the property, only one-half the value of the property is
subject to the inheritance tax. Estate of Simonson, 11 Wis. 2d 84, 104 N.W.
2d 134 (1960). However, transfers into joint tenancy without an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth, made within two years of the
transferor's death are presumed to be in contemplation of death under Wis.
STAT. §72.01(3) (a) (1963). Estate of Simonson, supra.
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Before considering the effect of terminating joint tenancies as a
device to reduce federal estate taxes, the gift tax liabilities incurred
on the creation of the joint tenancy and the nature of the "interests"
held by the joint tenants should be considered.5
I. CREATION OF JOINT TENANCIES-GIFT TAXES
At common law, in order to create a joint tenancy in property,
the four unities of time, title, interest, and possession were required.6
Section 230.45 of the Wisconsin Statutes eliminates the require-
ment of these unities in the case of a transfer between husband and
wife of real or personal property when the instrument evinces an
intent to create a joint tenancy.' Also, subsection (3) of section
230.45 eliminates these requirements in the case of real property,
even though the grantor is also one of the named grantees, when
the deed evinces an intent to create a joint tenancy. 8 Creation of
joint tenancies in bank accounts and corporate stock raise special
problems which will be discussed later.
Assuming then, that a joint tenancy in property has been creat-
ed, the question is whether the creation constitutes a gift for federal
and Wisconsin gift tax purposes. For federal gift tax purposes the
regulations provide that:
If A with his own funds purchases property and has the
title conveyed to himself and B as joint owners, with rights
of survivorship . . . but which rights may be defeated by
either party severing his interest, there is a gift to B in the
amount of half the value of the property.9
To this general rule, section 2515 creates an exception in the case
of a joint tenancy in real property created between spouses during
the calendar year 1955 or thereafter. Such a transfer will not be
treated as a gift, regardless of the contributions of each spouse, un-
less the donor elects to treat the transfer as a gift by filing a gift
"For convenience it is assumed that there are only two joint tenants involved
and that the donor and the donee are residents of Wisconsin.6 Estate of Gabler, 265 Wis. 126, 60 N.W. 2d 720 (1953).
7 Wis. STAT. §230.45(2) (1963) :
"Any deed, transfer or assignment of real or personal property from husband
to wife or from wife to husband which conveys an interest in the grantor's
lands or personal property and by its terms evinces an intent on the part
of the grantor to create a joint tenancy between grantor and grantee shall
be held and construced to create such joint tenancy, and any husband and
wife who are grantor and grantee in any such deed, transfer or assignment
heretofore given shall hold the property described in such deed, transfer
or assignment as joint tenants."
s Wis. STAT. §230.45(3) (1963) :
"Any deed to 2 or more grantees, including any deed in which the grantor
is also one of the grantees, which, by the method of describing such grantees
or by the language of the granting or habendum clause therein evinces an
intent to create a joint tenancy in grantees shall be held and construed to
create such joint tenancy."9 Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(h) (5) (1958).
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tax return for the calendar year in which the gift was created.10 If
the donor elects to treat the transfer as a gift, the return must be
filed, even though no gift tax may be due."
For Wisconsin gift tax purposes the creation of a joint tenancy
in real property between spouses is subject to gift tax when one
spouse furnishes in excess of one-half the consideration for the
property.12 Unlike the federal provisions, the donor spouse has no
election as to whether the transfer will or will not constitute a gift.
In the case of joint bank accounts, federal and state law are in
accord in that the creation of such an account does not constitute
a gift:
If A creates a joint bank account for himself and B (or a
similar type of ownership by which A can regain the entire
fund without B's consent), there is a gift to B when B draws
upon the account for his own benefit, to the extent of the
amount drawn without any obligation to account for a part of
the proceeds to A.13
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reached the same result when con-
struing section 72.76(7) of the Wisconsin Statutes14 in Dept. of Tax-
ation v. Berry.'15
Similarly, United States savings bonds registered to "A or B"
are taxable for federal gift tax purposes when the donee-payee sur-
renders the bond for payment without obligation to account for the
proceeds. 16 It would appear that the result would be the same for
Wisconsin gift tax purposes under section 72.76(7).
The next question to be considered is the valuation of the gift
for tax purposes. Generally, the amount of the gift for federal tax
purposes at the creation of the tenancy is the difference between
the joint tenant's contribution to the tenancy and his "retained
interest" therein. The regulations provide that the "retained inter-
est" is dependent upon whether either party may unilaterally sever
the tenancy.'17 The rule applies for real and personal property (ex-
10 Treas. Reg. §25.2515-1(b) (1958).
11 Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2(a) (1958).
12 WIs. STAT. §72.75 (1963). See Forms 6 and 7, State of Wisconsin, Wisconsin
Department of Taxation:
"Taxable Transfers Or Gifts Include The Following:
12. Where A purchases property and has the title thereto conveyed to him-
self and wife as joint tenants, or where A conveys property to a third
person and causes it to be reconveyed to himself and wife as joint tenants
there is a gift to the wife in the amount of half the value of the property."
'13 Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 (h) (4) (1958).
14 WIs. STAT. §72.76(7) (1963) :
"A gift shall be complete for tax purposes when the donor has divested
himself of all beneficial interest in the property transferred and has no
power to revest any such interest in himself or his estate."
15 258 Wis. 544, 46 N.W. 2d 757 (1951).16 See note 13 supra.
17 Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2(b) (1958).
"(1) If under the law of the jurisdiction governing the rights of the spouses,
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cept bank accounts and savings bonds) whether or not the joint
tenants are husband and wife.'8 In Wisconsin, if either spouse trans-
fers into joint tenancy property which is used as the homestead,
under the provisions of section 235.01(2) of the statutes it has been
suggested that the value of such spouse's retained interest would be
based on life expectancy. 19 Since, as between husband and wife, the
husband has the right to select and the power to abandon the prop-
erty as his homestead2 0 it is submitted that the actuarial factors do
not apply since the husband could unilaterally sever the tenancy.
In all cases involving real or personal property other than home-
stead, there is no doubt that the actuarial factors would not apply,
since either party may sever the homestead. 2'
Once it has been determined that a joint tenancy has been created
and that the creation has resulted in a gift, and the value of the gift
has been arrived at, the tax liability may be completely eliminated
(depending on the particular facts) for both federal and state gift
tax purposes by application of the various deductions and exclu-
sions.
2 2
The regulations set forth the procedure for filing gift tax re-
turns, as does Section 72.81 of the Wisconsin Statutes. By the fed-
eral rules, the donor is required to file a federal gift tax return for
any transfers or transfers by gift to any one donee in excess of
$3000 made within the calendar year. The return is required even
though tax liability is eliminated by use of the marital deduction
and the specific execption.23 The practitioner is obliged to advise his
client to file any returns which are required for transfers made in
previous years and when filing such a return, Section 6601 of the
Internal Revenue Code requires payment of interest on the tax due
of six percent per annum. 24 Returns due for mortgage payments or
improvements to the property should not be overlooked.2 5
II. THE INTEREST PROBLEM
Assuming that death taxes or other considerations have led to a
either spouse, acting alone, can bring about a severance of his or her interest
in the property, the value of the donor's retained interest is one-half the
value of the property.(2) If . . . neither, acting alone, may defeat the right of the survivor of
them to the whole of the property, the amount of retained interest of the
donor is determined by use of the appropriate actuarial factors for the
spouses at their respective attained ages at the time the transaction is effected.
's Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(h) (1958).
19 ECKHARDT, WORKBOOK FOR WIscoNsIN ESTATE PLANNERS, §7DO.6 (1961).
20 Radtke v. Radtke, 247 Wis. 330, 19 N.W. 2d 169 (1945).
21 WIs. STAT. §276.01 (1963).
22 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§2503(b), 2521, and 2523(a) ; Wis. STAT. §72.80
(1963).
23 Treas. Reg. §25.6019-1 (1958).
24 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6651, and Treas. Reg. §301.6651-1 (1957) for
penalties imposed for failure to file a return "without reasonable cause."
25 Treas. Reg. §25.2515-1(b) (1958).
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decision that joint tenants should transfer their property into other
forms of property ownership, the ultimate success in reducing death
taxes may depend upon the determination of the exact property
interest held by each joint tenant at the time of the transfer. For
federal tax purposes the interest in property held by a person with-
in a state is determined by applicable state law.2 6 It is necessary
therefore, to consider the nature of the property "interests" of joint
tenants in Wisconsin.
Real Estate
Joint tenants possess equal rights to enjoy the estate during
their lives, each having an. undivided one half interest in the prop-
erty.27 This rule was repeated in Jezo v. Jezo,2 8 an action for parti-
tion of jointly owned real and personal property in which the hus-,
band alleged that he had contributed eighty percent toward the ac-
quisition of the assets. The husband appealed from the lower court's
judgment dividing the proceeds equally. The case was remanded to
redetermine the respective contributions of the joint tenants, the
Supreme Court pointing out that:
* * , the interests of joint tenants being equal during their
lives, a presumption arises that upon dissolution of the joint ten-
ancy during the lives of the cotenants, each is entitled to an equal
share of the proceeds. This presumption is subject to rebuttal,
however, and does not prevent proof from being introduced that
the respective holdings and interests of the parties are unequal.
The presumption may be rebutted by evidence showing the
source of the actual cash outlay at the time of acquisition,
the intent of the cotenant creating the joint tenancy to make a
gift of the half interest to the other contenant . . . or other
inferences contrary to the idea of equal interest in the joint
estate. (Emphasis added.) 29
The statement of the court that 'proof may be introduced that the
respective holdings and interests of the parties are unequal' may
cause problems for the estate planner. If joint tenancies are termi-
nated, and converted into tenancies in common for planning pur-
poses, it is the respective interests of the joint tenants which will
determine whether the severance constitutes a gift for gift tax pur-
poses, and whether the transfer is for a full and adequate consider-
ation if the transfer is attacked as being made in contemplation of
death. For example, if each party owns an undivided one-half inter-
est in property held in joint tenancy and the parties decide to sever
the tenancy to create a tenancy in common, the transfer is made for
28 Sullivan's Estate v. Comm'r, 175 F. 2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949).27Farr v. Grand Lodge, A.O.U.W., 83 Wis. 446, 53 N.W. 738 (1892); Bassler v.
Rewodlinski, 130 Wis. 26, 109 N.W. 1032 (1906).
2823 Wis. 2d 399, 127 N.W. 2d 246, noted at 48 MARQ. L. REv. 277 (1964).
2923 Wis. 2d at 406, 127 N.W. 2d at 250.
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a full and adequate consideration since each holds a one-half interest
both before and after the transfer. However, if it can be shown that
the interests of the "joint tenants" were unequal because of varying
contributions, e.g. seventy-five percent and twenty-five percent, the
transfer into the tenancy in common is made for less than a full
and adequate consideration since one joint tenant transfers a three-
fourths interest in the joint tenancy in return for a one-half interest
in the tenancy in common. Also, a gift of one-quarter interest would
result.
It would appear that in a "true joint tenancy" the interests of
the parties are equal, but that a "joint tenancy in form" is not neces-
sarily a "joint tenancy in fact" or a "true joint tenancy." The court
indicates that the presumption that the interests of the joint tenants
are equal may be rebutted by evidence showing an intent on the
part of the cotenant creating the tenancy to make a gift to the other
cotenant. If the cotenant creating the tenancy has an election under
Section 2515 of the Internal Revenue Code to treat the creation as
a gift for federal gift tax purposes and elects not to, it would ap-
pear that this evidence could be introduced to rebut the presump-
tion that each spouse had an undivided one-half interest in the ten-
ancy. It is submitted that most joint tenancies are created as will
substitutes with no specific intent on the part of the donee-spouse
regarding gifts, and the election to treat the creation of the tenancy
as a gift is not made to avoid or postpone gift taxes.
Personal Property
Bank Accounts
In general, the interest of joint tenants in joint bank accounts
created entirely from the funds of one of the parties will depend
upon the intention of the donor depositor.3 0 When the issue before
the court involves the right of survivorship, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court has said that a rebuttable presumption arises that the donor
depositor intended that all of the usual incidents of jointly owned
property, including survivorship, shall attach to the account. To
support a different intention the evidence must be clear and satisfac-
tory3l or clear and convincing"
For planning purposes it is necessary to determine the interests
of the joint depositors during their lifetime. As previously men-
tioned, Dept. of Taxation v. Berry,33 establishes that a transfer of funds
in a joint bank account does not constitute a gift for Wisconsin gift
tax purposes when the depositor retains the right to withdraw the
30 Estate of Pfeifer, 1 Wis. 2d 609, 85 N.W. 2d 370 (1957).
31 Id. at 613, 85 N.W. 2d at 372.
3 Estate of Michaels, 26 Wis. 2d 382, 391, 132 N.W. 2d 557, 561 (1964).
3 Note 15 supra.
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entire account. Whether or not the donor depositor has created a
revocable account again depends upon the depositors intent when
creating the account, and the mere form of the deposit in the records
of the bank does not determine the rights of the parties.34 When the
depositors or joint owners are husband and wife, section 230.45
(2) 35 raises a presumption that the transferor intends a true joint
tenancy and each party has an equal interest therein, and neither
may deprive the other of his one-half interest in the account.36
Although the court was dealing with the question of survivor-
ship, Estate of Pfeifer3 7 supports the proposition that the creation of a
joint tenancy in personal property raises the presumption that the
interests of the parties are equal even though they are not husband
and wife since an equal interest is a usual incident of jointly owned
property.
An account may be created in which the donee depositor has no
present interest nor right of survivorship if the evidence establishes
that the form of the account was merely for the convenience of the
donor depositor.3 Recently, the court has expressly recognized an
account with no present rights in the donee depositor but with the
right of survivorship.39
It is apparent therefore, that the exact nature of the property
interests held by joint depositors in joint bank accounts will vary
depending upon the intention of the donor depositor at the time the
account is created.
Even though the practitioner is able to establish that a true
joint tenancy exists in a joint bank account, each party having an
equal interest therein, if the contributions to the account were un-
equal and the account is terminated for planning purposes with
each party receiving one-half thereof, the transfer will constitute a
gift for gift tax purposes regardless of the intention of the donor-
depositor when creating the account. However, if the donor-de-
positor dies within three years of the transfer and the transfer is
deemed to be in contemplation of death, it is suggested that it was
made for a full and adequate consideration, since each party held
an equal interest therein.
Securities
According to the Rules of the Stock Transfer Association, the
proper form of registration for listed securities to indicate joint
tenancy where abbreviations are not defined on the security is
34 Zander v. Holly, 1 Wis. 2d 300, 84 N.W. 2d 87 (1957).
35 Note 7 supra.
36 Estate of Schley, 271 Wis. 74, 72 N.W. 2d 767 (1955); Estate of Grey, 27
Wis. 2d 204, 133 N.W. 2d 816 (1964).
37 Note 30 supra.
38 Plainse v. Engle, 262 Wis. 506, 56 N.W. 2d 89 (1952).
39 Note 32 supra.
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"John Doe & Mary Doe Jt. Ten."40 In practice, the transfer agent
may be even more specific and register the stock in the name of
"John Doe and Mary Doe As Joint Tenants With Right of Survi-
vorship and Not As Tenants In Common." With such specific lan-
guage, generally there can be no question as to the rights of the
parties or the actual form of ownership. However, if A originally
holds the stock in his own name and sends the certificate to the
transfer agent to be re-registered in the names of A and B as indi-
cated above, according to Zander v. Holly-" the parties hold as ten-
ants in common with a "type of survivorship or indestructible re-
mainder. '42 There is no joint tenancy because unity of title and
time are absent. Despite the language appearing on the face of the
certificate, a valid argument exists that the entire value of the stock
should not be taxed under section 2040 if the sole contributing joint
owner died first. If the party who established the co-ownership re-
tained possession of the certificate, could the remaining half be
taxed under another provision of the estate tax?43 It is submitted
that since either co-owner could force partition and obtain pos-
session under the provisions of Chapter 277 and Section 331.06 of
the Wisconsin Statutes,44 the remaining one-half should not be taxed.
If the donee-co-owner authorizes the stock transfer agent to issue the
dividend checks to the donor-co-owner the transfer would be taxed as
a retained life estate.45
When the question involves the rights of joint owners of un-
listed stock, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated46 that the
following language will create a joint tenancy: "Registered in the
40 RULES OF THE STOCK TRANSFER ASSOCIATION, Rule 14.02.
41 Note 34 supra.
42 1 Wis. 2d at 316, 84 N.W. 2d at 96.
43 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2037:
"(a) General Rule.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has . . . made a transfer (except in the case of a bona fide sale for an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or other-
wise, if-(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of
such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest . . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
44 WIS. STAT. §277.01 (1963):
"Complaint; trial, how had. When any of the owners of personal property
in common shall desire to have a division and they are unable to agree
upon the same an action may be commenced for that purpose ... "
WIS. STAT. §331.06 (1963):
"Recovery of divisible personalty. When personal property is divisible and
owned by tenants in common and one tenant in common shall claim and
hold possession of more than his share or proportion thereof his cotenant,
after making a demand in writing, may sue for and recover his share or
the value thereof .... .
45 INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §2036.
46 Central Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Schumacher, 230 Wis. 591, 597-98, 284 N.W.
562, 565 (1939).
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name of Mr. & Mrs. _ or survivor;" "Registered
in the name of A and B or either ;" "Issued to Mr. & Mrs.
;" "Payable to A and B ;" "Payable to A or wife."
Therefore, it may be necessary to look behind the form of the
registration of stock certificates to ascertain the exact value of the
interest held by the joint owners. Apparently, the safest form would
be: "John Doe and Mary Doe, As Joint Tenants With Right of
Survivorship, and Each an Equal One-Half Interest Herein and Not
As Tenants in Common."
III. IMPACT OF RECENT FEDERAL TAX CASES
A termination of a joint tenancy may be advisable in order to
reduce death taxes. However, the effect of a termination has been
clouded by recent federal cases. The federal government has suc-
ceeded in extending the principles of section 2036, Transfers with
Retained Life Estate, and section 2035, Transfers in Contemplation of
Death, so as to include joint tenancy interests which apparently had
been terminated.
Retained Life Estates
If a husband holds a considerable amount of property in joint
tenancy with his wife, one approach may be to transfer a portion of
the assets to the wife to be held by her as sole owner. In this case
the interest which the husband transfers will constitute a gift for
gift tax purposes.4 7 However, if the property is income producing,
the transfer will not reduce death taxes if the husband retains the
right to the income.4 Further, if the property transferred is the
residence of the joint owners and continues to be used as the resi-
dence there is a possibility that the transfer will not free the prop-
erty from death taxes because of his "implied" retained life estate.
The reasoning follows from a review of recent cases interpreting
section 2036.
In Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. United States,49 the decedent and
his wife held their residence as tenants by the entirety. Decedent
deeded his interest to his wife as a gift and resided there with his
47 If the joint tenancy was created after 1955 and the election to treat the crea-
tion as a gift was not made, Treas. Reg. §25.2515-1(b) (1958) provides:
".... there is a gift upon the termination of such a tenancy, other than by
the death of a spouse, if the proceeds received by one spouse on termination
of the tenancy are larger than the proceeds allocable to the consideration
furnished by that spouse to the tenancy ..
48 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §2036:
"(a) General Rule.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or
otherwise, under which he has retained for his life...
(1) the possession of enjoyment of, or the right to the income from,
the property.. .."
49 238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).
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wife until his death. The government contended that the facts estab-
lished an implied agreement between decedent and his wife that he
should have a right to live there and that such an agreement is a
proper basis for including the property in decedent's gross estate
as a retained life estate. In the alternative, the government con-
tended, the mere fact that he continued to live there is a sufficient
basis to include the property in his gross estate under section 2036.
The court held that the mere fact that the decendent lived in the
residence after the transfer and until his death is not, in and of it-
self, sufficient basis upon which to include the residence in his gross
estate. However, if there was an agreement between the decedent
and his wife, express or implied, even though unenforceable, that
he should have the right to continue to live in the residence, this
would be a sufficient basis to include the residence in his gross
estate.-0 It was for the jury to determine whether an agreement
existed.
A case decided shortly after the Union Planters case, Stephenson
v. United States51 involved a similar fact situation. Decedent pur-
chased the house in which he and his wife had been living and had
it conveyed to her. He remained there until his death. The court
followed the decision of Union Planters, and on the basis of the
wife's deposition found that no agreement, express or implied, ex-
isted between decedent and his wife as to the retention of any pos-
session or enjoyment by the husband.52 A determination by the In-
ternal Revenue Service that an implied agreement or understanding
existed was presumed to be correct and the burden was on the exe-
cutor to show by the greater weight or clear preponderance of the
evidence that no such implied agreement or understanding existed.
The Wisconsin Inheritance Tax Act provides for a state tax on
transfers of this nature.5 3 In Estate of Ogden, 4 a gift of realty made
with the understanding that the donor was to have the income dur-
ing his lifetime was held subject to the inheritance tax. There was
no question of an implied agreement since the understanding as
to retention of income was set out in a letter written to the donor
50 Id. at 884-85.
5' 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965).
52The wife deposed that her husband had said that she could even "put him
out" if she so desired. Id. at 662 n. 2.53 Wis. STAT. §72.01 (1963).
"Subjects liable. A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon any transfer of
property ... in the following cases... :
(3) (b) When a transfer is of property, made without an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth . . . intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of the grantor .... in-
cluding any transfer where the transferor has retained for his life or
for any period not ending before his death: (1) the possession or enjoy-
ment of, or the right to the income, or to economic benefit from, the
property...."
54209 Wis. 162, 244 N.W. 571 (1932).
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by the donee. It would appear that an implied agreement of the kind
discussed above, which is sufficient to include a residence in dece-
dent's gross estate for estate tax purposes would by analogy, be
sufficient to subject the residence to the Wisconsin inheritance tax.
Therefore, if the husband transfers his interest in the jointly
held residence to his wife and continues to reside there, the wife
may incur unexpected legal expenses establishing that no agree-
ment existed between her and her husband regarding the husband's
right to live there. This writer suggests that a severence of the
joint tenancy and a transfer into a tenancy in common would eli-
minate the retained life estate problem, since the transfer would be
made for a full and adequate consideration, and would remove one-
half of the value of the jointly owned property from the husband's
estate. It is assumed, of course, that the interest of the joint tenants
are equal, that is, a joint tenancy in fact exists.
Contemplation of Death
Except to the extent that a transfer is for a full and adequate
consideration, transfers made within three years of decedent's death
are deemed to be made in contemplation of death within the mean-
ing of section 2035 and are included in decedent's gross estate un-
less the executor proves otherwise. 5 This section and section 2040
have been applied together in cases of termination of joint tenan-
cies.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the follow-
ing question in Sullivan's Estate v .Comm'r:-" "Where two joint ten-
ants agree to terminate a joint tenancy and henceforth hold the
property as tenants in common and transfer each to the other the
interest held by each, and this is done in contemplation of death by
the decedent, is the entire amount of the property to be included in
the gross estate of the deceased joint tenant under . . . [section
(2040)] ?"57 The court held that "if... the contract [terminating the
joint tenancy] be construed to involve a transfer, it was a bona fide
transfer for money's worth because the younger wife's joint interest
transferred to the older husband is worth at least as much as the
husband's interest transferred to her."' 8 The property was held not
included in decedent's gross estate under section 2040 because the
joint tenancy was terminated before his death and, as to the joint
tenancy, the deceased bad no "interest therein ... at the time of his
death."5 9
55 Treas. Reg. §20.2035-1 (a) & (c) (1958).
56 175 F. 2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949).
57 Id. at 653.
58 Id. at 659.
59 Id. at 650.
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Unfortunately, not all courts follow the reasoning of the Sullivan
case. In United States v. Allen,60 decedent created an irrevocable
trust in which she reserved three-fifths of the income for her life.
When she was seventy-eight years old, the actuarial value of his re-
tained life estate was approximately $135,000 and her attributable
share of the corpus was valued at $900,000. She sold her interest to
a remainderman for $140,000. The Internal Revenue Service con-
tended that three-fifths of the corpus, less $140,000, should be in-
cluded in decedent's gross estate because the sale was made for less
than a full and adequate consideration and in contemplation of
death. The court refused to follow the Sullivan decision and held
that there must be an adequate and full consideration paid for the
interest which would otherwise be included in the gross estate and
not merely a full and adequate consideration for the interest transferred
by the decedent.61
Of particular interest to Wisconsin attorneys is a recent deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Glaser v.
United States,62 decedent, an Indiana resident, furnished the con-
sideration for several parcels of real estate to which he and his wife
took title as tenants by the entireties. They conveyed their parcels
to their children, reserving a life estate to themselves and to the
survivor of them. The district court, following the Sullivan case,
ruled that one-half the value of the parcels should be included in the
decedent's gross estate, since he held a one-half interest in the par-
cels at the time of the conveyance. The government contended that
sections 2036 and 2040 should be read together to include the full
value of the property in decedent's gross estate. It was the position
of the government that had decedent died before the conveyance
the full value would have been included under section 2040; that, in
effect, after the conveyance the decedent retained the same interest
for federal estate tax purposes that he had before the conveyance.
The court held that "since the properties had been transferred be-
fore the decedent's death, section 2040 has no application. Under
this section it is only 'the value of property held jointly at the time
of decedent's death' that is includable. Treas Reg., Section 20.2040-1."63
The circuit court agreed with the district court that the Sullivan
case states the applicable law in that each joint tenant had "an equal
interest, under Indiana Law, in the properties, and neither tenant
could convey or make a transfer of a greater interest than he or
she owned or had a right to transfer, namely, a one-half interest.""
60293 F. 2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961).
61 Id. at 918.
62 196 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd in part, 306 F. 2d 57 (7th Cir. 1962).
63 306 F. 2d at 60.
64 Id. at 59.
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COMMENTS
It is submitted that this reasoning may be applied by analogy to
Wisconsin residents, each having an undivided one-half interest in
a true joint tenancy, who sever the tenancy to create a tenancy in
common. The transaction could not be attacked as being made in
contemplation of death, since the transfers are made for a full and
adequate consideration.
CONCLUSION
It appears that if, for general estate planning purposes, it is de-
cided that the joint tenancy should be terminated, there is nothing
to lose from an estate tax standpoint. If the property is left in joint
tenancy, unless the executor can prove that the surviving joint ten-
ant supplied all or a portion of the consideration, the entire value of
the property will be included in the decedent's gross estate for fed-
eral purposes. Unless the entire value of the property is included in
decedent's gross estate as a retained life estate, if the transfer is
made and the party who supplied the consideration for the creation
of the tenancy survives for a period of at least three years, section
2035 will not apply. If the party does not survive the transfer by
three years, the executor may be able to overcome the presumption
that the transfer was in contemplation of death. However, assum-
ing the transfer is held to be in contemplation of death, the executor
will still have the authority of the Sullivan decision to support his
contentions that: first, section 2040 has no application since there
was no jointly held property "at the time of decedent's death;"
second, and "adequate and full consideration" within the meaning of
section 2035 refers to the property interest transferred and not to
the interest which would be taxed but for the transfer. Unfortunate-
ly, the second contention is subject to an attack based on the holding
of the Jezo65 case that the transferor had more than a one-half inter-
est in the jointly owned property. It would appear that the govern-
ment would be able to introduce evidence that the interests of the
joint tenants were unequal, and the executor would be faced with
the burden of showing what portion of the consideration for the
property was supplied by the surviving joint tenant.
ROGER J. MUELLER
65 Note 28 supra.
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